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by Glenn Robinson 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
May 1, 2002 
Israel's assault on West Bank Palestinian towns throughout April 2002 and its even longer siege and then 
occupation of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat's presidential compound in Ramallah, have raised legitimate 
questions about how long Arafat will remain in power in Palestine. After all, Arafat is already older than 
King Husayn of Jordan and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria were at the time of their deaths in recent years, and 
Arafat has suffered from a number of physical ailments, particularly since his near-fatal plane crash in 
Libya. In addition to the ravages of time, Arafat must also worry about assassination attempts, either from 
Palestinian dissidents or Israeli commandoes. Even as the siege of Arafat is coming to an end, the 
questions of his physical longevity and of political succession in Palestine only intensify. The intent of this 
essay is not to predict which personality will eventually succeed Arafat, but rather to outline some of the 
major issues that will define the succession process when it occurs. 
Succession for what exactly? 
Arafat currently wears four different political hats: he is the duly elected president (al-ra'is) of the 
Palestinian Authority, the interim government on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; he is the chairman of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); he is the head of the major faction within the PLO, Fatah; and, 
as is usually forgotten, he is the president of the State of Palestine that was officially declared by the PLO 
in 1988. The first point to be made about succession is that the era of one man's domination of all the 
major posts in the Palestinian national movement will come to an end upon Arafat's death. Different 
leaders will more than likely fill these posts and, potentially, rival leaders may fill them. Whether this will 
represent democratization at the leadership level or fragmentation of the movement will depend on the 
context in which it happens. Even in the unlikely event that one man fills multiple leadership posts in the 
post-Arafat era, it is inconceivable that he will enjoy the same concentration of power that Arafat has 
garnered over the years.  
Context is Everything 
Assuming that the real interest in succession concerns the position of political head of the Palestinian 
polity or state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then the second general point is this: the context in which 
succession occurs is utterly critical in determining its outcome. If Arafat dies peacefully in his sleep in five 
years' time when he is the president of a Palestine that is at peace with its neighbors, then it is likely that 
succession will be peaceful and legally executed. If, on the other hand, Arafat is assassinated next week 
by Israeli sharpshooters, or killed by internal dissidents in the midst of accusations of "selling out" to Israel, 
then it is much more likely that succession will be violent and extra-legal. Thus, the context and timing of 
Arafat's death will be critical in determining whether men with guns come to power, or a legal process 
brings a popular leader to power. This in turn will tell us much about the future of Palestinian politics. 
On paper, the legal process for choosing a new PA president is straightforward: the speaker of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council, or parliament, (currently Abu 'Ala) holds office for 60 days during which 
time new popular elections are held. However, for this process to proceed all parties must ignore legal 
realities -- which they probably would. Legal reality #1 is that all of the institutions created by the Oslo 
process (including the PLC, its Speaker, and the Ra'is) officially expired in May 1999. The Oslo accords 
were explicitly limited to a maximum of five years from the creation of the PA (which formally occurred in 
May 1994 in Cairo with the signing of the 'Gaza-Jericho' agreement). Legal reality #2 is that the basic law 
that governs succession in the Palestinian Authority has never been formally promulgated. Thus, in order 
for the legal succession to proceed, the speaker of a body that technically does not exist (the PLC) will 
apply a law that does not formally exist to hold elections for a position (president) whose legal standing is 
likewise in doubt. Of course, gentlemen's agreements to keep these institutions in place have occurred, 
and politics will always trump legal niceties, but the dubious legal nature of the existing institutions of the 
PA should not be ignored in any succession discussion. 
Two Elites 
While the context in which succession takes place will go a long way in determining which leader 
ultimately emerges, we can point to the major political cleavage which will be the dividing line of 
competition. That cleavage is not the secular-religious divide of the PLO and Hamas, although one 
cannot dismiss its importance. Rather, the dominant cleavage of succession will be between the "Oslo 
elite" and the "Intifada elite", or what others have called the "old guard" and "new" or "young" guard. The 
Oslo elite represents the old leaders of the PLO, beginning with Arafat himself, but including many other 
top Palestinian officials such as Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Ahmad Qur'ei (Abu 'Ala), and Nabil Sha'th. 
These men have lived most of their lives in exile, many since 1982 in Tunisia where the PLO 
headquarters were located (which is why they are often referred to by fellow Palestinians as the 
"Tunisians"), and many are getting rather old. It was this old guard that made peace with Israel in 1993 -- 
the Oslo accord -- from their homes in exile. 
Conversely, the "Intifada elite" -- or new guard -- was born and raised in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
and has had a very different life history than its Oslo elders. Members of this group tend to be 
economically poorer but better educated, and know Israel much more intimately than do those old leaders 
coming back from exile. Some, like Marwan Barghouti, speak excellent Hebrew. These are people quite 
willing to make peace with Israel or to fight with Israel, but who hold no particular illusions about Israel's 
occupation. They have also been the most outspoken critics of the authoritarianism and corruption 
practiced by the PA. It was the young guard who fought Israel in the first Intifada, or uprising, in 1987-93 -
- a largely unarmed resistance -- and it is this same young guard that led the current and much more 
violent al-Aqsa Intifada. This group also built the pluralistic institutions of civil society in Palestine. In short, 
it is a much more modern elite than Arafat and his cohorts, and better able to mobilize Palestinian society 
at the grassroots level -- because that is where they grew up. This elite will be much harder to cut a 
peace deal with, but much more likely to make a good deal stick. 
The competition between these two sets of political elites will largely determine succession and the future 
of Palestinian politics. It is in part a generational struggle, but more importantly a sociological conflict 
between two very different types of elites with different visions and different "rules of the political game." 
And given that the Oslo elite's chief political project -- the "peace process" of recent years -- has been so 
utterly discredited in Palestinian eyes (having only led to more settlements and more land confiscations 
by Israel), it is a good bet that Arafat's successor will come from the ranks of the home-grown Intifada 
elite. 
Will Succession Change Anything? 
The obvious answer to this question is yes; the passing of "Mr. Palestine", the man who has so 
symbolized Palestinian politics for over three decades, cannot help but have an impact. On a deeper, 
more structural level, however, Arafat's death may not significantly change the basics of Palestinian 
politics. The vast imbalance of power between Israel and Palestine will outlive Arafat, so the basic 
hegemonic nature of any peace process will remain intact. Moreover, as I have argued at some length 
elsewhere, the basic political economy in Palestine will lend itself strongly to the kind of soft 
authoritarianism practiced by Arafat and the PA well into the future. Palestine, much like the oil states of 
the Gulf, is a "rentier state" where money flows from the top down, with very little extraction of taxes from 
society by the PA. This gives social forces very little leverage to push for democratic openings. Mr. 
Arafat's death will not change this basic fact. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources. 
 
